fundamental axiotic relation is a relation between value, valuing subject, and cultural good. This value-oriented self-formation of the subject eventually concerns values that intrinsically or immanently belong to its own subjectivity, and hence, to its freedom: autonomous, intrinsic values. Therefore, the concept of self-formation concerns the value determinacy as such of the subject. As a realizing condition of values, the subject is itself a real subject, and a real subject is a subject among other subjects, part of a plurality of subjects.
If the social is essentially the realm of realizing values or validity, then-to speak in terms of Hegel's philosophy of spirit-reason, and hence freedom, becomes actual or comes into existence (Dasein).1 Hegel's realm of right is exactly this realm of the existence of freedom.2 This entails a broad concept of right, a concept of right in which the will is conceived of as ἐνέργεια (actuality), or, to put it in another way, as the being-at-work of freedom or as coming into being of spirit by its self-determination according to reason. In conformity with this broad concept of right, the concept of right as the existence of the free will, that is, the will that has made freedom its "inner determination and purpose," has to be actualized in an "externally found objectivity" and, consequently, the concept of freedom to be realized in the "external objective side," bringing itself to fulfilment as the "idea."3 This development starts with "abstract right"4 as the existence of freedom of the actual free will in individual persons who put their will in objects that are external to them.5 At the beginning of Hegel's elaborations on abstract right, we are dealing with the case of free spirit that is maximally external to itself (to put it differently, the spirit, which was the final figure of the philosophy of subjective spirit). A process of conceptual development begins. It starts with the free will in its 'immediate' figure (abstract right); then it enters into a figure 'reflected in itself' (morality), and subsequently, in the realm of object spirit-that is regarding the volitional aspect of free spirit-it ends in a "substantial" will, in which subjectivity and objectivity are reconciled (Sittlichkeit).6
Although both Hegel and Kantian transcendental philosophy hold the social to be a condition of actualizing freedom, they develop significantly different concepts of that condition. Which of them offers a more adequate concept of the social, and hence, comprehends better what the existence of
